Page 59 - Azerbaijan State University of Economics
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THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE


               important  in  establishing  market  power  and,  therefore,  anticompetitive

               effects of some business practices.
                     In  most  abuse  cases  definition  of  the  relevant  market  is  likely  to  be

               based on functional characteristics of the product and on consumer behavior.

               These may include physical characteristics of the product, uses to which the
               product is suited, and evidence about buyers’ willingness to switch from one

               product to another as relative prices change. Other factors, such as switching
               costs and parallel price movements that indicate substitutability, also may be

               relevant. Similarly, defining the relevant  geographic market is likely to  be
               based on factors, such as transportation costs and perishability, that limit the

               ease with which products can be moved over long distances.

                     Markets  in  antitrust  (especially  merger)  cases  are  sometimes  defined
               using  the  “prospective  price  increase”  or  the  “hypothetical  monopolist”

               approach.  This  asks  whether  consumers,  faced  with  a  price  increase,  could

               easily switch to an alternative product or another supplier. If the answer is yes,
               then the alternative product and source of supply is included in the relevant

               market for the case.
                     The  underlying  principle  -  the  focus  on  consumer  responses  to  price

               increases-can also be useful in defining markets in abuse of dominance cases.
               The  application  of  these  principles,  however,  is  different.  That  is,  abuse  or

               monopoly cases typically relate to a lessening of competition that has already

               occurred rather than what may occur as a result of a proposed merger. In abuse
               cases  it  is  likely  that  prices  will  already  have  been  raised  above  competitive

               levels. And any further increase will probably result in massive substitution by
               consumers.  Such  evidence  of  substitutability  is,  however,  entirely  consistent

               with the exercise of market power in a properly defined market in an abuse of
               dominance case. Of course, at the investigation stage it is not certain that an






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