Page 60 - Azerbaijan State University of Economics
P. 60

STUDYING OF SPECIAL PRACTICAL ISSUES OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE

               abuse has occurred and that prices are currently above competitive levels, but

               the investigator should be aware of this possibility.
                     This point is illustrated by the U.S. cellophane  case, which involved

               allegations that the du Pont de Nemours & Company had monopolized the

               supply  of  cellophane  in  the  United  States  in  violation  of  the  Sherman

               Antitrust  Act. The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  defined  the  relevant  market  as
               consisting of a broad range of flexible wrappings, including waxed paper and
               other materials, as well as cellophane. The Court found that these products

               were  perceived  as  reasonably  interchangeable  by  consumers.  Some
               commentators, however, say that the Court was wrong in defining the market

               so broadly. In particular, it failed to recognize that consumer willingness to

               switch to alternative products at a monopoly price is fully consistent with the
               exercise  of  market  power  by  a  monopolistic  firm.  As  a  result  it  failed  to

               appreciate the extent of market power exercised by the du Pont Company.

                     More  generally  in  abuse  cases,  defining  the  relevant  product  and
               geographic  markets  should  take  into  account  the  impact  of  alleged

               exclusionary  practices,  which  typically  sit  at  the  heart  of  the  case.  An
               example: contrast the relevant market useful for assessing a merger of banks

               offering Visa and MasterCard services with the relevant market necessary for
               analyzing  alleged  exclusionary  conduct  by  Visa  and  MasterCard  toward  a

               new low-priced card entrant. The first case would include new card issuers

               who  would  enter  the  industry  if  the  price  of  credit  card  services  rose
               significantly.  But  such  potential  entrants  would  be  excluded  in  the  second

               case because firms that would enter only at a higher price are not relevant to
               assessing the feasibility of entry by a low-price firm [see Salop 1993].

                     In  some  cases  it  may  be  preferable  to  look  for  direct  evidence  of
               exploitation  of  market  power  (for  example,  abnormally  high  prices  or  profits)

               rather than focus on market definition. Alternatively, one may look for historical



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