Page 66 - Azerbaijan State University of Economics
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STUDYING OF SPECIAL PRACTICAL ISSUES OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE



               reviewed by regulators. Transition economies may wish to consider a similar

               approach.
                     When a regulatory agency does not exist, the competition authority would

               likely be responsible for ensuring that the industry performs as competitively as

               possible. If the industry is truly a natural monopoly (that is, cost considerations
               dictate  that  only  one  firm  should  supply  the  market),  then  the  competition

               agency may need to consider regulating prices and practices of the firm. But
               given the difficulty of regulating prices, such action should be taken only when

               it is clear that the market is indeed a natural monopoly and that entry cannot be
               expected to help restore competitive pricing.

                     Finally, excessive prices  may not result from superior efficiency  of the

               dominant firm but from exclusionary practices aimed at abusively extending or
               maintaining dominance. For example, a vertically integrated dominant firm may

               refuse to sell some of its products to other firms. Such practices can promote

               higher prices. For instance, a telephone company may refuse to sell information
               on subscribers, so that it can be the sole provider in the markets in which such

               information  is  most  valuable  (for  example,  mailing  list  services,  direct
               marketing, and marketing research). Competition might then be reduced in these

               markets. The best course of action is to put a stop to the practices that restrain
               competition, eliminating the firm's ability to charge excessive prices.

                     Price  discrimination.  Price  discrimination  is  the  practice  of  a  seller

               charging  different  prices  according  to  the  profile  of  the  customer  and  in  the
               absence  of  appreciable  cost  differences  that  might  justify  different  prices.  A

               discriminatory strategy can also involve charging the same price to customers
               even  though  there  are  different  costs  of  supplying  them.  With  price

               discrimination,  a  firm  may  earn  higher  profits  than  when  it  charges  a  single
               price  (net  of  costs)  to  all  consumers.  Some  extra  profits  may  come  from

               increased sales; thus price discrimination can increase a firm’s total production.



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