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STUDYING OF SPECIAL PRACTICAL ISSUES OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE



               violated  if  a  manufacturer  used  vertical  restraints  -  establishing,  say,  a

               network of exclusive dealers - to better control costs and, as a result, expand
               sales relative to smaller rivals. Higher-cost rivals would be disadvantaged by

               the dealership network, but the (more efficient) exclusive network should not

               be considered a violation of antitrust laws.
                         Another way in which vertical restraints might raise rivals’ costs and

               hurt  competition  is  the  following.  Suppose  a  dominant  firm  in  a  man-
               ufacturing market possesses market power but is not a monopolist, that is, it

               faces  competition  from  other  manufacturers,  which  restrains  the  price  that
               the  manufacturer  can  charge  its  dealers.  Suppose  also  that  downstream

               dealers  typically  carry  products  of  many  upstream  manufacturers.  Finally,

               suppose  that  the  manufacturer  negotiates  with  its  downstream  dealers
               contracts that contain vertical restraints - say, an exclusive dealing provision.

               Unless  rivals  can  find  alternative  dealers,  the  manufacturer’s  exclusive

               dealership network raises rivals’ costs of distributing products. Thus prices
               paid by consumers for rival products increase, permitting the manufacturer

               with  the  exclusive  network  to  raise  the  wholesale  price  to  its  exclusive
               dealership network. Consumers are hurt as a result.

                     Two  additional  points  should  be  made  about  this  vertical  restraint.
               First,  there  must  be  barriers  to  entry  into  the  dealer  market.  If,  instead,

               services  provided  by  a  dealer  in  the  exclusive  network  could  be  easily

               replicated by other dealers (that is, barriers to entry are low), then costs of
               the dominant firm's rivals would not increase and there would be no harm to

               consumers.
                     Second,  the  competition  agency  must  strive  to  link  the  exclusive

               dealership network to higher costs incurred by the manufacturer's rivals. (In
               some jurisdictions, profits lost are also taken into consideration.) This can be

               difficult, but it must be done to distinguish an anticompetitive use of vertical



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