Page 80 - Azerbaijan State University of Economics
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STUDYING OF SPECIAL PRACTICAL ISSUES OF ABUSE OF DOMINANCE



               international licensing agreements would raise costs or reduce incentives (or

               both) for technology owners to enter into voluntary arrangements. Voluntary
               arrangements  are  also  more  likely  to  promote  the  host  country's

               technological advance rather than to promote compulsory measures; they are

               more likely to be accompanied by transfer of non-patented know-how and
               capital  investment,  which  are  necessary  to  effectively  use  information

               protected by intellectual property rights.
                     Assessing  abuse  resulting  from  government  intervention.  Broadly,

               competition  laws  apply  to  firms'  practices  not  to  government  decisions.  If  a
               (validly  enacted)  statute  or  regulation  limits  competition  unnecessarily,

               however, a competition agency may have an important role in advocating pro-

               competitive change to the legislation.
                     In  this  context  it  is  useful  to  introduce  a  kind  of  hierarchy  of  the

               discretionary power of firms. A firm is clearly responsible for its practices if it

               makes decisions independently of any public intervention. The same is true if
               the  government  merely  encourages  firms  to  move  in  certain  directions  but

               does not require them to follow specific practices. Further, even if there were a
               regulatory  intervention  and  the  firm  had  some  discretion  over  its  action,

               practices can violate antitrust rules if the firm could reasonably have engaged
               in a course of action less restrictive than that chosen.

                     There are jurisdictions in which a practice stemming from a government

               decision  can  still  be  subject  to  antitrust  proceedings.  For  example,  in  the
               United States the State Action Immunity doctrine imposes implied limits on

               conduct that may be shielded from liability under antitrust laws by regulatory
               actions of state and local governments. Behavior of firms subject to regulatory

               intervention  is  exempted  from  the  law  only  if  the  conduct  is  undertaken
               pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” state policy and

               is “actively supervised” by the state.



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