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THE        JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE, V.80, # 1, 2023, pp. 21-34

                    Concerning the above conditions, some questions will arise including, where is the
                    optimal location of sale agent in this city? Will the sale agent be launched at city center
                    or in another street? In what condition is it better to launch sale agent at city center
                    than margins?

                    In what condition is the sale agent at city center more profitable for monopolist than
                    several  agents  in margin  areas?  In  what  condition  will the monopolist agree  with
                    launching a sale agent at city center and several sale agents in suburb areas instead of
                    just one sale agent at city center? At the end, how will the monopolist decide on the
                    number and location of sale agents? In following, these questions will be studied and
                    the results will be analyzed.

                    SELECTION OF LOCATION AND NUMBER OF SALE AGENTS
                    The aim of monopolist is to specify first where to select the location of sale agents in
                    which part of city, and secondly, how many sale agents to launch. To this end, in
                    follow, the monopolist's options will be studied in various conditions.

                    First  state:  Launching  a  sale  agent  at  city  center  or  suburb  area
                    First this question will be studied that if the monopolist intends just to have one sale
                    agent, where is the optimal location, at city center or city margin? The answer to this
                    question is presented in theorem 1:

                    Theorem 1:
                    If the monopolist wants to launch just one sale agent and the following condition is
                    established,
                                                                 
                                                          
                                                   2
                                            2 (   ) +    (1 − − 2  ) − (   − 1)  
                                         ≥                     2
                                                               − 1
                    Then the optimal location of sale agent will be at city center rather than city margin.

                    Proof:
                    First we will obtain the situation of indifferent consumer in respect to purchase from
                    sale agent at city center or his failure in purchase. Concerning the same length of
                    streets and therefore the same situation of indifferent consumer on each street, in order
                    to achieve the indifferent consumer in this state, we have:

                                                                              
                                                       D
                                            B −    − p = 0  ⇒   ̂ =     −   
                                                   
                                                                    

                    If the sale agent is located at city center, based on the assumptions of the model, all
                                                                    D
                    consumers with non-negative surplus (B −    − p ≥ 0) will purchase the intended
                                                                 
                    good. Concerning the constraint related to achievement of non-negative profit γ by
                    the sale agents, the maximum price that the monopolist could demand from sale agent
                    will be achieved from the following equation:

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