Page 16 - Azerbaijan State University of Economics
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Adalat J. Muradov, Nazim Ö. Hajiyev: Analytical frameworks and procedures for application of
demonopolization
expenses are high, then those equipment should remain in that enterprise based on the decision of
agencies enforcing demonopolization.
4.a. Horizontal section
A decision on demonopolization of properties of funds in a horizontal relationship
supplying the same limited market with goods is of primary importance as the structure of
properties of these funds reduces competitive activity of private enterprises in a given market.
The first step of demonopolization capable of reducing the competition generated by a number of
independent supplier- companies is to divide funds into two enterprises.
There is no method of determining the number of independent supplier-companies
necessary for effective competition in the limited market. Usually, it is considered that, the
higher the number of such companies, the better it is, however, this division accompanying the
production lasts until increasing general production expenses in the market. Sufficiently great
social efficiency from competition is obtained in the result of substitution of non-regulated
monopoly with two rivals (if rivals do not conclude a collusive or open treaty with each other).
But a bipolar structure becomes subject to a collusive treaty more frequently than other
oligarchic markets. Thus, one can think that, the minimum number of companies with relatively
higher advantages of competition should be three. Note that, when analyzing the influence of the
number of market participants on competition, a number of other more detailed market indicators
may be a more penetrating factor affecting expected tension of competition in a specific market.
In this manner, each market may be demonopolized through horizontal fragmentation of
funds of an enterprise into three independent enterprises among three equipotential supplier-
companies.
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